Minimal linear codes have significant applications in secret sharing schemes and secure two-party computation. There are several methods to construct linear codes, one of which is based on functions over finite fields. Recently, many construction methods for linear codes from functions have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we generalize the recent construction methods given by Tang et al. in [IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 62(3), 1166-1176, 2016] to weakly regular plateaued functions over finite fields of odd characteristic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
L INEAR codes have diverse applications in secret sharing schemes [1] , [7] , [9] , [10] , [17] , [33] , authentication codes [14] , communication [19] , association schemes [5] , strongly regular graphs [6] and secure two-party computation [29] . Their construction is an attractive research topic in cryptography and coding theory. Several construction methods have been proposed, one of which is based on functions over finite fields (e.g., [7] , [12] , [13] , [17] , [27] , [29] , [31] , [35] ). Two generic constructions, which are called the first and second generic constructions, of linear codes from functions have been distinguished from the others in the literature. In the construction methods based on the second generic construction, several linear codes with perfect parameters have been constructed from functions such as bent functions, quadratic functions and weakly regular bent functions (e.g., [12] , [17] , [31] , [32] , [35] ). Indeed, Tang et al. (2016) have constructed in [31] two-or three-weight linear codes from some weakly regular bent functions over finite fields of odd characteristic based on the second generic construction. This inspires us to construct linear codes with more flexible parameters from weakly regular plateaued functions over finite fields of odd characteristic. In this paper, to obtain new classes of linear codes with few weights, we use some weakly regular plateaued functions in the construction method given in [17] , [31] based on the second generic construction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sets the main notation and gives a background in finite field and coding theory. In Section III, we present some results related to weakly regular plateaued functions. In Section IV, we construct threeweight linear codes from weakly regular plateaued functions over finite fields of odd characteristic. Section V deals with a punctured version and subcode of each constructed code. In Section VI, we reveal that all constructed codes are minimal for almost all cases and then describe the access structures of the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes of the constructed minimal codes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, after setting the basic notation, we mention the connection between linear codes and secret sharing schemes. We end this section by recording some properties of weakly regular plateaued functions.
A. Basic Notation
We fix the following notation unless otherwise stated. For any set E, #E symbolizes the cardinality of E and E = E \ {0}. For a complex number z ∈ C, |z| denotes its magnitude. For a prime power q = p n , where p is an odd prime and n is a positive integer, F q is the finite field with q elements and F q = ζ is a cyclic group with generator ζ. The trace of α ∈ F q over F p is defined by Tr n (α) = α + α p + α p 2 + · · · + α p n− 1 and ξ p denotes the complex primitive p-th root of unity. The symbols SQ and N SQ denote, respectively, the set of all squares and nonsquares in F p . Moreover, η and η 0 symbolize, respectively, the quadratic characters of F q and F p . Finally, p * denotes η 0 (−1)p = (−1) (p−1)/2 p and hence p n = η n 0 (−1)
1) Cyclotomic Field Q(ξ p ): A cyclotomic field Q(ξ p ) is established from the rational field Q by adjoining ξ p . The ring of integers in Q(ξ p ) is defined as O Q(ξp) = Z[ξ p ] and its integral basis is the set {ξ i p : 1 ≤ i ≤ p − 1}. The field extension Q(ξ p )/Q is Galois of degree p − 1, and Gal(Q(ξ p )/Q) = {σ a : a ∈ F p } is the Galois group, where the automorphism σ a of Q(ξ p ) is defined by σ a (ξ p ) = ξ a p . The cyclotomic field Q(ξ p ) has a unique quadratic subfield Q( √ p * ), and so Gal(Q(
The reader is referred to [21] for further reading on cyclotomic fields.
B. Linear Codes and Secret Sharing Schemes

1) Linear Codes:
A linear code C of length n and dimension k over F p is a k-dimensional linear subspace of the ndimensional vector space F n p , and denoted by [n, k] p . An element of C is said to be a codeword. The Hamming weight of a vector a = (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ) ∈ F n p , denoted by wt(a), is the cardinality of its support defined as supp(a) = {0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 : a i = 0}. The minimum Hamming distance, denoted by d, of C is defined as the minimum Hamming weight of its nonzero codewords. The dual code C ⊥ is defined by
is the standard inner product on F n p . We note that C and its dual code C ⊥ over F p are, respectively, represented by [n, k, d] p and [n, n−k, d ⊥ ] p , where d ⊥ denotes the minimum Hamming distance of C ⊥ .
Let A w denote the number of codewords with Hamming weight w in C of length n. Then, (1, A 1 , . . . , A n ) is the weight distribution of C and the polynomial 1 + A 1 y + · · · + A n y n is called the weight enumerator of C. The code C is said to be a t-weight code if the number of nonzero A w in the weight distribution is equal to t. A generator matrix G of C is a k × n matrix whose rows form a basis for C.
We now state the covering problem of C. We say that a codeword a of C covers another codeword b of C if supp(a) contains supp(b). A nonzero codeword a of C is said to be minimal if a covers only the codeword ja for every j ∈ F p , but no other nonzero codewords of C. A linear code C is said to be minimal if every nonzero codeword of C is minimal. The covering problem of C is then a problem of finding all minimal codewords of C. Note that this problem is rather difficult for general linear codes, but easy for a few special linear codes. The following lemma says that all nonzero codewords of C are minimal if the Hamming weights of its nonzero codewords are too close to each other. Lemma 1. (Ashikhmin-Barg) [2] All nonzero codewords of a linear code C over F p are minimal if
where w min and w max denote the minimum and maximum Hamming weights of nonzero codewords in C, respectively.
Recently, a necessary and sufficient condition on minimal linear codes has been given in [18, Theorem 11] , and an infinite family of minimal linear codes violating the above sufficient condition has been presented in [8] , [13] , [18] .
2) The Application of the Linear Codes in Secret Sharing
Schemes: We first give a brief introduction to secret sharing schemes and then examine the application of minimal linear codes in secret sharing.
A secret sharing scheme consists of a dealer D, a group P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n−1 } of (n−1) participants, a secret space S, (n − 1) share spaces S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n−1 , a share computing procedure and a secret recovering procedure. The dealer D chooses a secret s from S, computes a share of s for each participant P i and then gives the share to P i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. The share computing procedure and the secret s are known only to D, while the secret recovering procedure is known to all the participants in P. A set of participants who can recover s from their shares is called an access set. It is called a minimal access set if any of its proper subsets cannot recover s from their shares. The set of all access sets is called the access structure of a secret sharing scheme.
Secret sharing schemes were introduced in 1979 by Blakley et al. [3] and Shamir [30] . The construction of secret sharing schemes from linear codes has been widely studied in the literature (e.g., [7] , [15] , [17] , [23] - [25] ), and the following construction was introduced in 1993 by Massey [23] , [24] . Given a linear [n, k, d] p code C, its k × n generator matrix G is represented by G = [g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g n−1 ]. In the secret sharing scheme based on C, the secret s is an element of F p . In order to obtain the shares with respect to s, D chooses randomly a vector u = (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u k−1 ) ∈ F k p such that s = u · g 0 , where " · " is the standard inner product on F k p . Notice that the number of such vectors u is equal to p k−1 . The dealer D computes the corresponding codeword t = (t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t n−1 ) = (u · g 0 , u · g 1 , . . . , u · g n−1 ) and then assigns t i to party P i as share for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
We remark that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the set of minimal access sets of the secret sharing scheme based on C ⊥ and the set of minimal codewords of C (see in [7] , [23] ). The following proposition describes the access structure of a secret sharing scheme based on the dual code of a minimal linear code.
Proposition 1.
[15], [33] Let C be a minimal linear [n, k, d] p code over F p with the generator matrix G = [g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g n−1 ]. Then, in the secret sharing scheme based on C ⊥ , the number of participants is (n − 1) and the number of minimal access sets is p k−1 .
then participant P i must be in all minimal access sets; otherwise, in (p − 1)p k−2 out of p k−1 minimal access sets.
every set of t participants is involved in (p − 1) t p k−(t+1) out of p k−1 minimal access sets.
In the case of d ⊥ = 2, some P i 's must be in all minimal access sets and such a P i is called a dictatorial participant. In the case of d ⊥ ≥ 3, each P i has the same role, because P i is included in the same number of minimal access sets for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Such a secret sharing scheme is called democratic. In both cases, secret sharing has an interesting access structure.
C. Weakly Regular Plateaued Functions
In this subsection, we introduce some results about weakly regular plateaued functions. Let f : F q −→ F p be a p-ary function. Its Walsh transform is given by
for some p-ary function f : F q → F p , and called weakly regular bent if there exist a complex number u with |u| = 1 and a p-ary function f such
Notice that f is also a weakly regular bent function.
As an extension of bent functions, the notion of plateaued functions was introduced in characteristic 2 by Zheng and Zhang (1999) in [34] . A function f is said to be p-ary
It is worth noting that every bent function is a 0-plateaued function. We also remark that the Walsh support of an s-plateaued f is defined by
and #Supp( χ f ) = p n−s . Besides, the absolute Walsh distribution of an s-plateaued function follows from the Parseval identity.
Lemma 2. Let f : F q → F p be an s-plateaued function. Then, for β ∈ F q , | χ f (β)| 2 takes the value p n+s and 0, respectively, p n−s and p n − p n−s times.
The following non-trivial subclass of the class of plateaued functions has been introduced by Mesnager et al. [28] . It is motivated by an explicit expression of Walsh transform of a plateaued function given in [20, Theorem 2] .
where s is an integer with 0 ≤ s ≤ n. Then, f is called weakly regular s-plateaued if there exists a complex number u having unit magnitude such that
for all β ∈ F q , with g being a p-ary function over F q and g(β) = 0 for all β ∈ F q \ Supp( χ f ). Otherwise, f is called non-weakly regular p-ary s-plateaued. Note that a weakly regular f is said to be regular if u = 1. Lemma 3. [28] Let β ∈ F q and f : F q → F p be a weakly regular s-plateaued function. For every β ∈ Supp( χ f ), we have
where = ±1 is the sign of χ f and g is a p-ary function over
This lemma implies the following result.
Lemma 4.
Let β ∈ F q and f : F q → F p be a weakly regular s-plateaued function. Then for x ∈ F q ,
Proof: As a result of the inverse Walsh transform, we have
which completes the proof by considering p n = η n 0 (−1)
√ p * 2n . The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemmas 2, 3 and 4.
Remark 1. Lemma 5 confirms that such a function g, defined in the Walsh spectrum of f , cannot be balanced.
We now define a non-trivial subclass of the class of weakly regular plateaued unbalanced functions by setting two homogeneous conditions. Let f : F q → F p be a weakly regular s-plateaued unbalanced p-ary function, for 0 ≤ s ≤ n, and let WRP denote the class of these functions that satisfy the following two homogeneous conditions:
f (0) = 0, -There exists an even positive integer h with
for any a ∈ F p and x ∈ F q . Remark 2. To construct linear codes from functions, the previous works in [7] , [11] , [12] , [16] , [17] , [27] , [31] , [32] , [35] made use of some special classes of functions such as quadratic, (almost) bent, perfect nonlinear and weakly regular bent functions. Inspired by these works, for the purpose of constructing minimal codes with flexible parameters, we use a larger class WRP of functions offering more flexibility in the choice of functions.
We end this section with a few useful results about these functions.
Proof: For every z ∈ F p and β ∈ F q , we have
where k is a positive integer such that k(h − 1) ≡ 1 (mod p − 1) and l = k + 1. Notice that gcd(l − 1, p − 1) = 1, which implies that k needs to be odd. Then
where we used η n+s 0 (z l ) = 1 in the last equality. The proof is now complete.
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Lemma 6.
Proof: In view of Lemma 7 and [31, Lemma 2], the proof can proceed using the same argument given in the proof of [31, Proposition 4] .
Lemma 6 confirms that there exists a subset P S such that
and g is an unbalanced function satisfying g(0) = 0, g(ζ 2 ) = g(ζ 33 ) = g(ζ 42 ) = g(ζ 73 ) = 1 and g(ζ 5 ) = g(ζ 6 ) = g(ζ 45 ) = g(ζ 46 ) = 2. We also remark that Supp( χ f ) = {0, ζ 2 , ζ 5 , ζ 6 , ζ 33 , ζ 42 , ζ 45 , ζ 46 , ζ 73 } and P S = {0, ζ 2 = 2ζ 42 , ζ 5 = 2ζ 45 , ζ 6 = 2ζ 46 , ζ 33 = 2ζ 73 }.
III. EXPONENTIAL SUMS RELATED TO WEAKLY REGULAR PLATEAUED FUNCTIONS
In this section, we present some results about exponential sums related to weakly regular plateaued functions, which we need in Section IV to construct linear codes. Although these results were given in [31] for weakly regular bent functions, for the sake of completeness, we translated them into our framework. We begin this section by recalling the following lemma. Lemma 8. [22] We have the following.
i.)
The following lemma is used to determine the length of linear codes.
When n + s is even, we get
Proof: Clearly, we have
We first deal with the case when n + s is even. For all j ∈ F p , we have N f (j) = a and N f (0) = a + √ p * n+s for some constant integer a. Then, by the fact that
and hence a = (p n − √ p * n+s )/p. This completes the proof of the first case. When n + s is odd, we get
Then, we get N f (0) = p n−1 by Lemma 8 (i). The proof is now complete.
The following lemma is used to find the weight distributions of linear codes.
Lemma 10. Let f be a weakly regular s-plateaued function with
When n − s is even, we have
Proof: From Lemma 4, for x = 0, we have
√ p * n−s for some constant integer a. By Lemma 2, we get
When n − s is odd, we obtain
for all j ∈ F p by considering the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 9. Hence, we have
We then obtain N f,g (0) = p n−s−1 due to Lemma 8 (i), completing the proof.
The following lemmas are used in calculating the Hamming weights of linear codes.
Proof: We can immediately obtain
The assertion follows directly from Lemma 8 (i).
Then, for every β ∈ F q \ Supp( χ f ) we have S = 0, and for
Proof: The first case is trivial, so we provide a short proof of the second case. For every β ∈ Supp( χ f ), in the line of Lemma 6 and Proposition 2, we obtain the following
(see the proof of [31, Lemma 10] ). The proof is then completed by using Lemma 8.
Lemma 13. Let f ∈ WRP and define
Proof: By the definition of N f,β , we have
The proof follows by using Lemmas 11 and 12.
Proof: The proof is quite straightforward from Lemma 11.
Proof: Since the first case is clear from Lemma 6, we focus on the second case. For every β ∈ Supp( χ f ), by using Proposition 2, we get
The assertion then follows from Lemma 7.
when n + s is even; otherwise,
For every β ∈ Supp( χ f ), when n + s is even, we have
Otherwise,
Proof: From the proof of [31, Lemma 14] , we have
where N f,β is as in Lemma 13. Then, substituting the identity N f,β + N sq,β + N nsq,β = p n−1 into the above equation, we obtain the desired results by using Lemmas 13, 14 and 15.
We end this section with the following remark deriving from Lemma 16.
Then, we have
IV. LINEAR CODES WITH FEW WEIGHTS FROM WEAKLY REGULAR PLATEAUED FUNCTIONS
In this section, we generalize the construction methods of linear codes proposed by Ding et al. [11] , [16] , [17] and Tang et al. [31] to a larger class of special functions for the purpose of obtaining several linear codes with flexible parameters.
We begin with a brief introduction about the construction methods of linear codes from functions. Boolean functions (and also, p-ary functions) have been widely used in coding theory to construct linear codes. For instance, the well-known binary codes such as the Reed-Muller codes and the Kerdock codes have been derived from Boolean functions. Recently, several linear codes have been derived from more general and complex functions. Nonetheless, one can distinguish two generic constructions of linear codes. The first generic construction of linear codes from functions is obtained by regarding a linear code C(F ) of length (q − 1) whose dimension is upper bounded by 2n:
where F is a polynomial on F q . The second generic construction of linear codes from functions is obtained by fixing a set D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d m } in F q and defining a linear code C D as
whose length is m and dimension is upper bounded by n. The quality of the parameters of C D depends on the choice of the set D, which is usually called the defining set of C D .
We now use some weakly regular plateaued functions in the well-known construction method of [11] , [16] , [17] based on the second generic construction. Let f be a p-ary function from F q to F p and define a set
Assume m = #D f and D f = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d m }. The second generic construction of a linear code C D f involving D f is defined as
where c β = (Tr n (βd 1 ), . . . , Tr n (βd m )). This is a linear code of length m and its dimension is at most n. It is obvious that for β = 0 the Hamming weight of c β is zero. For a general function f , determining the weight distribution of C D f is very hard, but easy for some special classes of functions. Based on this construction, several linear codes with perfect parameters have been constructed by researchers (e.g., [12] , [17] , [31] , [32] , [35] ). Firstly, K. Ding and C. Ding [17] determined the weight distribution of C D f for a p-ary quadratic bent function f (x) = Tr n (x 2 ). Then, weight distribution was determined by Zhou et al. [35] , Tang et al. [31] and Tang et al. [32] for quadratic bent functions, some weakly regular bent functions and inhomogeneous quadratic functions, respectively. We now solve this problem for a more general class of functions, i.e., the class of weakly regular plateaued unbalanced functions with some homogeneous conditions. The Hamming weights of C D f as well as its length are derived from Lemmas 9 and 13, and its weight distribution is determined by Lemmas 2 and 10.
Theorem 1. Let f ∈ WRP and C D f be defined as in (2) . Then, C D f is a three-weight linear code with parameters [p n−1 − 1 + η 0 (−1)(p − 1) √ p * n+s−2 , n] p when n + s is even, and [p n−1 − 1, n, (p − 1)(p n−2 − p (n+s−3)/2 )] p , otherwise. The Hamming weights and weight distribution are listed in Tables I  and II. Proof: From the definition of C D f , its length is equal to #D f = N f (0) − 1, which follows from Lemma 9. Similarly, for every β ∈ F q , the Hamming weight of a codeword c β in C D f is obtained as
which also follows from Lemmas 9 and 13. We now compute the Hamming weights only when n + s is even. The other case can be shown similarly. For every β ∈ F q \ Supp( χ f ), we have wt(c β ) = (p − 1) p n−2 + (p − 1) √ p * n+s−4 and the number of such codewords c β is given in Lemma 2. For every β ∈ Supp( χ f ), we obtain
where A = (p − 1)(p n−2 + η 0 (−1) √ p * n+s−2 ), and the number of such codewords c β is given in Lemma 10. Finally, the dimension of C D f follows from its weight distribution.
Remark 4. This remark is about necessary conditions on the parameters of Theorem 1. When n + s is even, we need the condition 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 4 if η (n+s)/2 0 (−1) = −1; otherwise, 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 2 and n ≥ 3. When n + s is odd, we have 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 3. This guarantees wt(c β ) > 0 for each β ∈ F q , which confirms that the code C D f has q distinct codewords. 
3 }, where = −1 and g is an unbalanced function satisfying g(0) = 0. So, C D f is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [2348, 8, 1458] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 260y 1458 + 5832y 1566 + 468y 1620 , which has been verified by MAGMA [4] .
Then, C D f is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [8, 3, 4] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 8y 6 + 6y 8 + 12y 4 , which has been verified by MAGMA.
Remark 5. When we assume only quadratic bentness in Theorem 1, we recover the linear codes obtained by Zhou et al. [35] .
We now use weakly regular plateaued unbalanced functions in the recent construction method proposed by Tang et al. [31] in order to construct new classes of linear codes. We define the sets
With similar definition of the code C D f defined by (2), we can define a linear code involving
where c β = (Tr n (βd 1 ), . . . , Tr n (βd m )), and a linear code
where c β = (Tr n (βd 1 ), . . . , Tr n (βd m )). Clearly, these codes have length m and dimension at most n. From Lemmas 9 and 16, we obtain their length as well as the Hamming weights of their codewords, and we determine their weight distributions by using Lemmas 2 and 10.
Theorem 2. Let f ∈ WRP and C D f,sq be defined as in (3) . Then, C D f,sq is a three-weight linear code with parameters [(p n−1 − η 0 (−1) √ p * n+s−2 )(p − 1)/2, n] p when n + s is even, and [(p n−1 + √ p * n+s−1 )(p − 1)/2, n] p , otherwise. The Hamming weights and weight distribution are listed in Tables III, IV and V. Proof: The length of C D f,sq is a consequence of Lemma 9 and for every β ∈ F q , the Hamming weight wt(c β ) = #D f,sq − N sq,β can be directly derived from Lemmas 9 and 16. We compute the Hamming weights only when n + s is even.
The weight distribution follows from Lemma 2 and 10. This completes the proof. 2 3 }, where = 1 and g is an unbalanced function satisfying g(0) = 0. Hence, C D f,sq is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [90, 5, 54] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 50y 54 + 162y 60 + 30y 72 , as verified by MAGMA. Remark 6. In this remark, we present necessary conditions on the parameters of Theorem 2. When n + s is even, we have the condition 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 4 if η (n+s)/2 0 (−1) = 1 and p = 3; otherwise, 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 2 and n ≥ 3. When n + s is odd, we have 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 3 if p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and η (n+s−1)/2 0 (−1) = −1 or p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and = −1; otherwise, 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 1. This means that wt(c β ) > 0 for each β ∈ F q , implying that the code C D f,sq has dimension n.
As a particular case of Theorem 2, we can give a shorter linear code C D f,1 defined as in (3) involving the set Proof: From the definition of C D f,1 , its length follows directly from Lemma 9 and for every β ∈ F q , the Hamming weight wt(c β ) = #D f,1 −N 1,β can be derived from Lemma 9 and Remark 3. Indeed, Hamming weights can be also obtained by dividing those of C D f,sq with (p − 1)/2. Besides, the dimension and weight distribution of C D f,1 are the same as the corresponding ones of C D f,sq , thereby completing the proof.
Example 5. The function f : F 3 4 → F 3 defined as f (x) = Tr 4 (2x 92 ) is a 2-plateaued (but not quadratic) unbalanced function in the set WRP and its Walsh coefficients satisfy
}, where = 1 and g is an unbalanced function satisfying g(0) = 0. Then, C D f,1 is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [36, 4, 18] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 4y 18 + 72y 24 + 4y 36 , as verified by MAGMA.
Theorem 3. Let n+s be an odd integer, f ∈ WRP and C D f,nsq be defined as in (4) . Then, C D f,nsq is a three-weight linear code with parameters [(p n−1 − √ p * n+s−1 )(p − 1)/2, n] p . The Hamming weights and weight distribution are given in Tables VI and VII. Proof: Clearly, the length of C D f,nsq is a consequence of Lemma 9 and for every β ∈ F q , the Hamming weight is equal to wt(c β ) = #D f,nsq − N nsq,β , which follows from Lemmas 9 and 16. For every β ∈ F q \ Supp( χ f ), we then get
The weight distribution follows from Lemmas 2 and 10. The proof is now complete.
Example 6. Let f : F 3 6 → F 3 be a function defined as f (x) = Tr 6 (ζx 4 +ζ 27 x 2 ), where ζ is a generator of F 3 6 = ζ for ζ 6 + 2ζ 4 + ζ 2 + 2ζ + 2 = 0. Then, f is a quadratic 1-plateaued unbalanced function in the set WRP and its Walsh coefficients satisfy
, where = −1 and g is an unbalanced function satisfying g(0) = 0. Hence, C D f,nsq is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [216, 6, 126] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 72y 126 + 576y 144 + 80y 162 , as verified by MAGMA.
Remark 7. This remark gives necessary conditions on the parameters of Theorem 3. If p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and η (n+s−1)/2 0 (−1) = 1 or p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and = 1, then we have the condition 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 3; otherwise, 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 1 for n ≥ 2. This implies that wt(c β ) > 0 for each β ∈ F q , and so, C D f,nsq has dimension n.
As a particular case of Theorem 3, we can give a shorter linear code C D f,2 defined as in (4) involving the set
We remark that the Hamming weights and length of C D f,2 can be obtained by dividing those of C D f,nsq with (p − 1)/2 while its dimension and weight distribution are the same as the corresponding ones of C D f,nsq (see Lemma 9 and Remark 3).
Proposition 5.
Let n + s be an odd integer and f ∈ WRP. Then, C D f,2 is a three-weight linear code with parameters The Hamming weights and weight  distribution follow from Tables VI and VII. Remark 8. If n + s is even, then C D f,nsq is a three-weight linear code with the same parameters and weight distribution as C D f,sq in Theorem 2.
Remark 9. When we assume only weakly regular bentness in the constructions of this section, we recover the linear codes obtained by Tang et al. [31] .
V. A PUNCTURED CODE AND SUBCODE
OF EACH CONSTRUCTED CODE In this section, we deal with punctured versions and subcodes of the codes constructed in Section IV.
A. A Punctured Code of Each Constructed Code
In this subsection, we obtain a shorter linear code, called punctured code, from each constructed code. This method does not change the dimension of the original code but reduces its length and minimum distance depending on the cardinality of the finite field. In other words, the length and minimum distance of the punctured code are much smaller than the original ones while its dimension does not change. So, punctured codes may have good optimality in the sense that they meet certain bounds on linear codes. Furthermore, since the minimum distance of the dual code of each punctured code is at least 3 (see Section VI), they can be directly used to construct democratic secret sharing schemes, which have diverse applications in the industry. Moreover, three-weight punctured codes can be used to construct association schemes given in [5] . Hence, this method is one of the most significant contributions of this paper from an application point of view.
When the Hamming weights of all nonzero codewords of a p-ary code have a common divisor, this code can be punctured into a shorter one. We first deal with a code C D f defined as in (2) . For any x ∈ F q , f (x) = 0 if and only if f (ax) = 0 for every a ∈ F p . Then one can choose a subset D f of D f defined as in (1) such that a∈F p aD f is a partition of D f :
where for each pair of distinct elementsd 1 ,d 2 ∈ D f we haved 1 d2 / ∈ F p . This implies that the linear code C D f can be punctured into a shorter one C D f involving the set D f . We then have a linear code
Notice that #D f = (p−1)#D f and for β ∈ F q , #{x ∈ D f : f (x) = 0 and Tr n (βx) = 0} = (p − 1)#{x ∈ D f : f (x) = 0 and Tr n (βx) = 0}. Hence, the Hamming weights and length of the punctured code C D f are directly derived from those of C D f by dividing them with (p − 1).
Corollary 1.
The punctured version C Df of the code C D f in Theorem 1 is a three-weight linear code with parameters [(p n−1 − 1)/(p − 1) + η 0 (−1) √ p * n+s−2 , n] p when n + s is even, and [(p n−1 − 1)/(p − 1), n, p n−2 − p (n+s−3)/2 ] p , otherwise. The Hamming weights and weight distribution are listed in Tables VIII and IX. Example 7. The punctured version C D f of Example 2 is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [1174, 8, 729] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 260y 729 + 5832y 783 + 468y 810 . Example 8. The punctured version C D f of Example 3 is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [4, 3, 2] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 8y 3 + 6y 4 + 12y 2 . This code is optimal owing to the Singleton bound.
We now consider the codes C D f,sq and C D f,nsq defined as in (3) and (4), respectively. For any x ∈ F q , f (x) is a quadratic residue (resp., quadratic non-residue) in F p if and only if f (ax) is a quadratic residue (resp., quadratic non-residue) in F p for every a ∈ F p . Then one can choose a subset D f,sq of D f,sq such that
One can hence define the punctured codes C D f,sq and C D f,nsq , whose parameters are directly derived from the original ones. Example 10. The punctured version C D f,nsq of Example 6 is a three-weight ternary code with parameters [108, 6, 63] 3 and weight enumerator 1 + 72y 63 + 576y 72 + 80y 81 . This code is almost optimal owing to the Griesmer bound.
B. The Subcode of Each Constructed Code With Flexible Dimension
In this subsection, we obtain a subcode of each constructed code by restricting an element of F q to the Walsh support of a function. This method does not change the length and minimum distance of the original code but reduces its dimension depending on the cardinality of the Walsh support of a function (namely, the length and minimum distance of a subcode is the same as the original ones, but its dimension is smaller than the original one). This implies that the dimension of the dual subcode is greater than the dimension of the original dual code while its minimum distance does not change much. Hence, some subcodes may have more optimality and they can also suggest more flexible secret sharing schemes with high democracy. This is another significant contribution of this paper from an application point of view.
To define a subcode of each p-ary code obtained in this paper, we restrict the elements from F q to the Walsh support of f ∈ WRP with order p n−s . We consider a linear code C D f over F p involving D f defined as
where c β = (Tr n (βd 1 ), . . . , Tr n (βd m )). This code is a
, . . . , Tr n (βd m )). We remark that the parameters of these subcodes are directly derived from the corresponding original ones. Proposition 6. Let f ∈ WRP. We have the following.
i Tables I and II. ii 
The Hamming weights and weight distributions follow directly from
) The subcode C D f,sq of the code C D f,sq in Theorem 2 is a two-weight code with parameters [(p n−1 − η 0 (−1) √ p * n+s−2 )(p−1)/2, n−s] p when n+s is even; otherwise, it is a three-weight [(p n−1 + √ p * n+s−1 )(p− 1)/2, n − s] p code.
VI. SECRET SHARING SCHEMES FROM THE CONSTRUCTED CODES
In this section, we first observe that the constructed codes in this paper are minimal and next describe the access structures of the secret sharing schemes based on their dual codes.
A. The Minimality of the Constructed Codes
In this subsection, with the help of Lemma 1, we show that all codes constructed in this paper are minimal for almost all cases. As an example, we give a simple proof for the code in Theorem 1, and similarly the others can be easily shown. 
Proof: If η (n+s)/2 0 (−1) = 1, then w min = (p − 1)p n−2 and w max = (p − 1) p n−2 + p (n+s−2)/2 ; otherwise, w min = (p − 1) p n−2 − p (n+s−2)/2 and w max = (p − 1)p n−2 . For both cases, the condition
is easily satisfied. This completes the proof by Lemma 1. 
Proposition 11. Let n + s be an odd integer with 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 5. The code C D f,sq in Theorem 2 is minimal. If η (n+s−1)/2 0 (−1) = 1, then its parameters are [(p n−1 + p (n+s−1)/2 )(p − 1)/2, n, p n−2 (p − 1) 2 /2] p , and [(p n−1 − p (n+s−1)/2 )(p − 1)/2, n, ((p − 1)p n−2 − (p + 1)p (n+s−3)/2 ) (p − 1)/2] p , otherwise. We conclude from this subsection that all codes constructed in this paper are minimal for almost all cases. As examples, the codes obtained in Examples 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 are minimal. Hence, secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes of the constructed codes have nice access structures described in Proposition 1. This is the main motivation behind our study of a punctured version and a subcode of each constructed code.
B. Secret Sharing Schemes From the Constructed Minimal Codes
In this subsection, we describe the access structures of the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes of the constructed minimal codes, with the help of Proposition 1.
To do this, we first deal with the minimum Hamming distance of each dual code.
Similar to the codes in [17] , the minimum Hamming distance d ⊥ of the dual code C ⊥ D f in Theorem 1 is equal to 2. This may be easily shown, but we still prefer to explain it. Clearly, d ⊥ cannot be 1 since 0 / ∈ D f . By definition, d ⊥ = 2 if and only if there exist two distinct elements d i , d j ∈ D f and an element a ∈ F p such that Tr n (xd i ) + aTr n (xd j ) = 0 (6) for every x ∈ F p n . Let
for every x ∈ F p n . Notice that d i = −d i since p is an odd prime. For d j = −d i and a = 1, (6) holds for every x ∈ F p n . This confirms that d ⊥ = 2. In a similar way, the dual codes of Theorems 2, 3 and Propositions 4, 5, 6 have minimum Hamming distance 2. Hence, by Proposition 1, one can describe the access structures of the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes of these codes. Such a secret sharing scheme has a dictator in the whole group of participants. As an example, we describe the following secret sharing scheme. access sets is equal to p n−1 . Moreover, if g i , i = 0, is a multiple of g 0 , then P i must be in all minimal access sets; otherwise, P i must be in (p − 1)p n−2 minimal access sets.
We now deal with punctured codes. One can easily show that the minimum Hamming distance d ⊥ of the dual code C ⊥ D f of Corollary 1 is at least 3. To see this, we first recall
if and only if there exist two distinct elementsd i ,d j ∈ D f and an element a ∈ F p such that Tr n (x(d i + ad j )) = 0 for every x ∈ F p n ; equivalently, d i + ad j = 0, which is a contradiction sinced ī dj / ∈ F p . This confirms that d ⊥ ≥ 3. In a similar way, one can see that the minimum Hamming distance of the dual code of each code obtained in Corollaries 2, 3 and Proposition 7 is at least 3. This implies that secret sharing schemes based on their dual codes have nice access structures described in Proposition 1. Such a secret sharing scheme is said to be democratic. We describe the following ones as examples. Corollary 6. Let n + s be odd with 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 5 and C D f be the minimal [(p n−1 − 1)/(p − 1), n, p n−2 − p (n+s−3)/2 ] p code in Corollary 1. Then, in the secret sharing scheme based on C ⊥ D f with d ⊥ ≥ 3, the number of participants is equal to (p n−1 − p)/(p − 1) and the number of minimal access sets is equal to p n−1 . For any fixed 1 ≤ t ≤ min{n−1, d ⊥ −2}, every set of t participants is involved in (p − 1) t p n−(t+1) minimal access sets.
Corollary 7.
Let C D f,nsq be the minimal [(p n−1 − p (n+s−1)/2 )/2, n, ((p − 1)p n−2 − (p + 1)p (n+s−3)/2 )/2] p code in Corollary 3. Then, in the secret sharing scheme based on C ⊥ D f,nsq with d ⊥ ≥ 3, the number of participants is equal to (p n−1 − p (n+s−1)/2 )/2 − 1 and the number of minimal access sets is equal to p n−1 . For any fixed 1 ≤ t ≤ min{n − 1, d ⊥ − 2}, every set of t participants is involved in (p − 1) t p n−(t+1) minimal access sets. Example 11. Let C D f,nsq be the three-weight ternary minimal code in Example 10 with parameters [108, 6, 63] 3 . Then in the with d ⊥ ≥ 3, the number of participants is 107 and the number of minimal access sets is 243. Moreover, for t = 1, every participant is a member of 162 minimal access sets.
VII. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to construct several classes of minimal linear codes with good and flexible parameters. The main contributions are listed below: • For the first time in the literature, we made use of the notion of weakly regular plateaued p-ary functions in the construction method of linear codes based on the second generic construction. Although a well-known construction method was used in this paper, we obtained several new classes of linear codes with good and flexible parameters since our specific choice of the function employed is new and more flexible. Indeed, this paper uses a larger class of functions with the aim of obtaining more flexible parameters for linear codes. To the best of our knowledge, our minimal codes are inequivalent to the known ones in the literature (since there is no minimal linear code with these parameters). • One of the most important contributions of this paper is to obtain punctured code from the original one. The punctured codes can be directly used to construct democratic secret sharing schemes, which have diverse applications in the industry. Moreover, they may be (almost) optimal codes with parameters almost meeting certain bounds on linear codes. It is also worth noting that three-weight punctured codes can give association schemes introduced in [5] . • The next contribution is to obtain a subcode of each code constructed from a WRP function by restricting the elements of the finite field to its Walsh support. With this method, we obtained two-and three-weight subcodes from the original codes with more flexible dimensions. Since the dimension of each subcode is smaller than the original one, the obtained subcodes may contain more (almost) optimal codes and their dual codes produce more flexible secret sharing schemes with high democracy. Moreover, the two-weight subcodes in Proposition 7 can be used to construct strongly regular graphs from the method given in [6] . • By using a sufficient condition on a minimal linear code (see Lemma 1), we indicated that our codes are minimal for almost all cases, which confirms that they can be directly employed to construct flexible secret sharing schemes with high democracy. • With the help of Proposition 1, the access structures of the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes of our minimal codes were described. There are two types of access structures: the first type is democratic and the second one has a few dictatorial participants. Both types have diverse real-world applications.
APPENDIX THE PARAMETERS OF THE CONSTRUCTED CODES
The appendix presents the Hamming weights and weight distributions of the constructed codes in Tables I-XVII. 
